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A CHALLENGE
Methods and Objectives in the
Conft.ict of Laws: A Challenge
by Lea Brilmayer*
I believe that interest analysis is methodologically bankrupt, have said
so in print,l and have been criticized.- In my view, Brainerd Currie had
his own beliefs about how far statutes ought to reach in their multistate
applications, and these beliefs were methodologically on a par with the
maxims of the First Restatement.8 He should have defended the substan-
tive wisdom of these tenets on the merits. But rather than doing so di-
rectly-by empirical evidence, for instance, or by moral reasoning-he
sought to camouflage his preferences as effectuation of legis~tive policy
goals. He then claimed that any judge who adhered to the old territorial-
ist norms when the interest analysis norms required a different result was
operating in an undemocratic manner and invading the domain of the
legislature. Further, the judge was doing so in a manner that discouraged
legislative revision or reformulation."
It is crucial to unmask this fallacy. The scholars who have taken up the
• ProCessor oC Law, Yale Law School. University oC CaliCornia at Berkeley (B.A., 1970;
J.D., 1976); Columbia University (LL.M., 1978). Member, State Bar oC Texas.
1. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REv. 392 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A
Response to the 'New Critics,' 34 MERCER L. REv. 593, 596 (1983).
3. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
4. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
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cudgel on Currie's behalf are incapable of dealing with this most elemen-
tary methodological challenge: How do we know that application of Cur-
rie's definition of 'interest' better effectuates legislative policies than ap-
plication of-for example-the principles of the First Restatement?
Currie simply stated this assumption baldly, and his supporters have
since then accepted the assumption as proven.' My thesis is that the only
methodological difference between his normative premises and those of
the competing theorists is that Currie insisted that his breed of rabbit
really was in the statutory hat all along. By doing so, he paid state legisla-
tures a lip service the Bealeans had found unnecessary.
The interest analysts may have arguments in support of their meta-
physical assumptions. If such arguments exist, it would advance the game
to bring them forward. This short Article is designed to focus attention
on the methodological difficulties with Currie's approach as it is most
commonly practiced. The Article takes the form of a hypothetical prob-
lem followed by a set of questions. These questions concern three sets of
methodological problems: constitutional law, diversity jurisdiction, and
renvoi. I challenge any interest analyst-whether or not they agree with
my interpretation of Currie's writing, as a historical matter-to answer
this set of questions. I claim that the only explanation that can generate
the results that interest analysts reach involves a highly restrictive set of
normative premises which has little or no relationship to legislative policy
or statutory interpretation.'
I. THE HYPOTHETICAL
Jones and Smith are Connecticut domiciliaries and both reside in New
Haven. Jones proposes to Smith that they travel together in Jones' car to
New York City for an evening of cultural activities. They plan to return
late that same evening, but on the way home, they skid on icy pavement
near Rye, New York, and collide with a tree. Jones was negligent, but not
wantonly so. New York has a guest statute that would bar recovery; Con-
necticut does not.
This hypothetical is designed to be as clear and free from complications
as conflicts hypothetica1s can be. Presumably, the First Restatement
would counsel application of Ne~ York la~ as the location of the acci-
5. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 2. Clearly, there are degrees of support. Some scholars
might agree with his results, but for other methodological reasons. It would be interesting to
hear those reasons developed.
6. My own solution to these problems is outlined in Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in
Multistate Problems, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1315 (l981).
HeinOnline -- 35 Mercer L. Rev. 557 1983-1984
1984] A CHALLENGE 557
dent." This is not to say that a clever judge could not fin9 escape mecha-
nisms to avoid that result. For simplicity of the methodological inquiry,
however, we will assume a properly Neanderthal fidelity to First Restate-
ment principles, a judge unpolluted by' the all too human impulse to 'do
justice.' We are concerned with Bealeanism in its purest form.
The result is equally clear under interest analysis. Absent fancy she-
nanigans that Currie surely would not have approved, New York, as the
scene of the accident, would be found to have no 'interest.'8 Since New
York law would bar recovery, the 'blood on the streets' rationale is un-
available. Connecticut's interests, in contrast, are readily invoked on
Smith's behalf. Connecticut looks out for its own.'
I expect that the simplicity of this example will have aroused suspicion
instantly. What of the insurance company-where is it incorporated? And
the car-where is it garaged? Let us stipulate that any other factors that
might commend themselves to the ingenious mind all point inexorably
towards recovery under Connecticut law. The object is a hypothetical in
which the First Restatement, if honestly applied, requires application of
one state's law while interest analysis requires the other. Surely no one
doubts that such examples can be found. Let us assume that I have found
one.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Suppose that Smith is foolish enough to bring his action in a New York
court. The state court holds that the action is barred by the New York
guest statute and the highest state court agrees. Believing-as do some
interest analysts-that New York law cannot be applied constitutionally
to this case,10 Smith attempts an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. Does that Court have subject matter jurisdiction?
I assume that interest analysts would agree with me that the Court has
jurisdiction to hear the case, if the Court is so inclined. Presumably, the
Court's role includes determining whether New York has an 'interest' in
7. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1963).
8. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171,177-78, reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183-84
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Methods and Objectives]. [Editor's Note: Since most
of Currie's articles are reprinted in SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, a corre·
sponding page reference to this work will appear throughout this article in brackets immedi-
ately after the citation to the appropriate page in Currie's originally published article.]
9. Although I personally feel that either state might apply its law, my view on the mer·
its of the hypothetical is not the issue.
10. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 222, 237-39 [128, 145-46, 160-63J (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Currie, Survival of ActionsJ.
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having its guest statute applied. In making this determination, however,
is its function limited to interpretations of the New York guest statute?
To 'effectuating the policy goals of the New York legislature'? If so,
where is the federal question? The New York state courts have already
authoritatively declared the scope of New York state policy.
Would it matter if the New York guest statute had a statutory choice
of law provision stating that New York 'interests' require application to
any accident occurring within the state? Surely 'statutory construction'
compels the finding of an interest, if such a statutory provision exists, as
do 'effectuation of legislative policy' and 'fidelity of undemocratic institu-
tions to popularly elected legislatures'. Does it matter in this case that the
people of New York, acting through their state legislature, have indicated
a desire to have their law applied? What if the people of Connecticut,
acting through their legislature, also have built a choice of law provision
into their statute explicitly asserting that only the state of injury has an
'interest' in having its law applied? In that case, both legislatures have an
expressed policy of referring to the law of the state of injury.
Clearly, in these instances it is not deference to legislative policy that
motivates the Supreme Court to make its own determination of whether
there is an 'interest.' Yet it does make that determination, even in cases
in which there was a statutory choice of law provision.ll Is that because
the statutory choice of law provision did not invoke that magical concept,
'state interest'? Why should it matter from the Supreme Court's perspec-
tive whether the state legislature tips its hat to Brainerd Currie rather
than to Joseph Beale? What happens in situations when the application
of the New York rule is based upon judicially promulgated choice of law
principles rather than statutory directives? Does it matter, in other
words, whether the state's highest court cited Currie rather than Beale?
What if the state court deliberately purports to 'construe the statute' as
applicable to all accidents occurring within the state? Does that satisfy
the Constitution? Does it divest the Court of subject matter jurisdiction?
If the answer to either of these last two questions is 'yes,' are there any
limits to what a state may do in defining the scope of its own interests?
III. SUBCONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
AB I have set up the problem, there will be no diversity, and, therefore,
the Erie Railroad v. Tompkinsll/Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manu-
11. See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,
502 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935),
in which the Supreme Court ignored the statutory provisions for the purpose of identifying
interests.
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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facturing CO.13 issue will not arise. To enable us to address that issue, we
might specify that Smith is from Rhode Island, which, like Connecticut,
has no guest' statute. This change should not interfere with the approach
of either interest analysis or of the First Restatement. Let us specify,
then, that Smith has filed suit in federal district court in New York.
Now it is clear, initially, that the New York federal court is bound to
apply the same conflict of laws approach as would a New York state
court.14 The Supreme Court's reasoning in Klaxon requires this,1IJ and the
Court in Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challonerl8 stated that this is the
rule even when the state law that would be applied belongs to a jurisdic-
tion lacking an 'interest' in the Currie sense. I '1 One could hardly ask for a
clearer indication that, in theory, the Supreme Court's definition of the
term 'interest' and the Currie school's definition do not coincide. Let us
assume, however, that New York has officially adopted interest analysis
as a choice of law methodology. How is the federal district court to decide
whether New York has an 'interest'?
Would it be relevant, in the determination of interests, that the New
York guest statute had a choice of law provision declaring that New York
had an 'interest' whenever the accident occurred there? It seems that it
should be. If interest analysis has anything to do with statutory interpre-
tation or effectuation of legislative policy goals, then a legislative finding
of this sort would be the most relevant evidence that, in theory, could be
available. Furthermore, it should not matter whether the legislation used
the magical word 'interest;' there should be an 'interest' as long as the
statute clearly compels the result. This is not to say, of course, that the
statutory provision necessarily answers constitutional doubts. I am refer-
ring only to the state law question of whether New York wants to see its
law applied in this situation. Although the interest analysts consistently
confound the state and federal questions, it is evident that they can be
separated sequentially.
If it is true that a diversity court accepts a state legislature's definition
of its own interests for subconstitutional purposes, then what is it to do
with a state's judicial definitions? It is clear from Klaxon and from Chal-
loner that diversity courts must follow them. But do those decisions con-
clusively prove the existence of an 'interest' in a state that has officially
adopted interest analysis? I assume that if there is a state precedent on
point that purports to interpret the guest statute to say that there is an
13. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
14. See id. Obviously, it also must address the constitutional issues, but a New York
state court also would do so.
15. 313 U.S. at 496.
16. 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
17. ld. at 4.
HeinOnline -- 35 Mercer L. Rev. 560 1983-1984
560 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
'interest' in cases when the accident occurred in New York, then the di-
versity court is as bound by that interpretation as it would be by a rule
that 'interest' turns on the residence of the plaintiff. At that point, only
constitutional issues would remain, and these could not depend on 'statu-
tory construction,' for diversity courts are not empowered to contradict a
state's interpretations of its own statutes.
Presumably, the same line of reasoning requires a diversity court to
comply with state judicial declarations about 'interests' when the sub-
stantive rule being interpreted evolved by common law and not by stat-
ute. State court interpretations of state law are authoritative,18 regardless
of whether the choice of law decisions are judicial or legislative;19 regard-
less of whether the substantive rule is judicial or legislative;IO and regard-
less of whether the 'interest' terminology pervades the process of inter-
pretation. A New York federal court engaged in ascertaining 'interests'
will be bound by the state court constructions that exist. Interests, there-
fore, may depend upon such archaic territorialist notions as the location
of the injury.
IV. RENVOI
A third set of problems resembles renvoi,ll for it concerns the extent to
which a court will take foreign choice of law rules into account. We have
already asked what considerations should influence an assessment of New
York 'interests' when litigation is before the United States Supreme
Court or the New York federal district courts. If suit is brought instead in
a state court in Connecticut, and Connecticut uses interest analysis,
would its courts find New York state to have an interest?
To my knowledge, no mainstream interest analyst would say that New
York can be shown to have an 'interest' solely by virtue of the fact that, if
given an opportunity, it would, in fact, apply its own law.II In all·the
stock examples, interest analysts consistently fail to ask whether the
other state would apply its own law. But what if New York has a statute
that says that there is a New York 'interest' whenever an accident oc-
curred within the state? Certainly, if statutory interpretation is the
method, an 'interest' exists. What if there is a New York choice of law
18. 304 U.S. at 78.
19. 313 U.S. at 496-97.
20. 304 U.S. at 78.
21. Currie, for example, said that his theory would obviate the renvoi problem com-
pletely. Currie, Methods and Objectives, supra note 8, at 178-79 [184). In ascertaining 'in-
terests,' only the state's intemallaw will ~atter, since my inquiry about deference to choice
of law rules is confined to the impact on 'interests.'
22. Some might say that a limiting definition of interests might be respected in order to
resolve apparent conflicts.
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provision, but it is not phrased in terms of 'interests'? What if there is a
judicial interpretation of the New York statute holding it applicable to all
intrastate accidents? Would it matter if that interpretation was phrased
in terms of 'interests'?
And what about New York conflicts decisions that interpret New York
rules of common law? Can they create 'interests'? To do so in the eyes of
other states, must the conflicts decisions use 'interest' phrasing, explicitly
purport to be 'construing' rules of substance, cite Currie's essays, or all of
the above? Is not a judicially created substantive rule construed along
Bealean lines the methodological equivalent, in the eyes of Connecticut
courts, of a statutory substantive rule with a statutory choice of law pro-
vision? No diversity court could, after Erie, set out to treat them differ-
ently. For renvoi purposes, it seems that other states should bow to both
or bow to neither. The 'effectuation of state policy' approach to interests
suggests acknowledgement of both unless, perhaps, the courts of Connect-
icut are more adept at the interpretation of New York law than New
York courts are.
SUMMARY
What can we conclude from this investigation of the methods for ascer-
taining 'interests' in the three different contexts of Supreme Court re-
view, diversity jurisdiction, and state assessment of other states'
interests?
First, it should be clear that the context most closely resembling the
interest analysts' ostensible methodology is the second-diversity juris-
diction. A diversity court deciding subconstitutional issues accepts the
definition of state interests of the state in which it sits without second-
guessing where the state's 'true interests' lie. The court effectuates state
legislative policy as expressed in state statutes and as interpreted by the
state courts, without imposing its own competing values. The Supreme
Court's reasoning in Erie requires the diversity court to do precisely what
the interest analysts purport to require in their methodology, namely, to
abandon the search for 'super law' based on self-evident logic and natural
justice, and cleave to state law as interpreted by the authoritative organs
of state government."
Constitutional review is another matter altogether. It is a matter of fed-
erallaw, not of state law, and so cannot depend in the same way upon the
interpretation of state statutes. It is no more desirable to merge these two
inquiries than to equate, in the state law of personal jurisdiction, the
question of whether a long arm statute purports to give jurisdiction with
23. 304 U.S. at 71-80.
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the question of whether procedural due process permits this. What a state
wants is not the same as what it is constitutionally entitled to. Besides,
confiating these two inquiries would require a state to exercise jurisdic-
tion in all cases where it was constitutionally allowed to exercise jurisdic-
tion. Otherwise, there would still be a residual question of state law even
after the constitution was satisfied, namely, whether the state wished to
exercise the legislative jurisdiction the Constitution allowed it. If states
need not exercise the constitutionally permissible jurisdiction, and under
present law they need not," then there are, of necessity, two inquiries.
Constitutional analysis is undeniably normative, with the norms drawn
from the Constitution. The interest analysts err in thinking that a single
usage of their term exists and that a single methodology will suffice. At
least it is clear where they went wrong and what they would have to do to
patch things up. They need two separate theories. The final con-
text-state assessment of other states' interests-is more puzzling.
Should a court, attempting to apply the Currie methodology, accept at
face value another state's definition of where its interests lie? Or should it
second guess that legislature's view of policy and the authoritative judi-
cial interpretations that go with it? None of Currie's methodological goals
explain how a Connecticut court may contradict New York's belief that
New York's self-interest requires application of New York law to New
York accidents. Only a normative theory of a priori maxims can account
for Currie's posture on this issue-a normative posture content to over-
ride actual expressions of intended territorial scope issuing from the
popularly elected voice of New York's citizenry-a normative posture
designed to reflect more precisely New York's 'true' needs. The Currie
methods treat this as similar to the Constitutional context-as norma-
tive-but should have treated it like diversity, if state policy is the goal.
Interest analysts inject their own normative preferences into choice of
law discussions, but attempt to evade detection by masquerading these
preferences as 'legislative policy! Frequently this ruse works, because
there is no obvious legislative policy. Whenever such a legislative policy
does exist, however, their premises are exposed for what they are. Thus,
Currie attacked proposed legislative revision of a judicial decision that
reached the same result as interest analysis: legislatures were to leave
these issues to courts unless they framed their choices in ways that the
Currie machine found palatable.·' More generally, the method ignores au-
24. Perkins v. Bengu"et Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
25. See his discuuion of Grant v. McAuliffe, and the subsequent reaction in the Califor-
nia legislature, in Currie, Survival ot Actions, supra note 10, at 246 (170). See also his
suggestion that states should not adopt interstate treaties. Currie, Married Women's Con-
tracts: A Study in Conflict-ot-Laws Methods, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 263-64 [77, 121-22)
(1958); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice ot Law: Govemmentallnterests and the
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thoritative declarations of state policy that always exist in situations in
which one court looks at the local law of another legal system. Our ques-
tions reveal three such situations: Supreme Court review, diversity juris-
diction, and renvoi.
Normative premises are unavoidable in legal reasoning. Some are de-
rived from the Constitution. Others are judicial creations for filling in the
gaps in legislation. The fact that they are unavoidable does not mean that
they can be disguised as 'statutory construction,' nor does it mean that
they can be used to overrule or ignore actual statutes, unless, of course,
they are derivable from the Constitution. Currie was as metaphysical as
Beale. The interest analysts should try to justify their maxims on the
merits and drop their show of methodological one-upsmanship.
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9, 11 n.5 [188, 190 n.5] (1958).
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